When is news reporting fair use under copyright law?

Blogger claims fair use supports his challenge to DMCA takedown of YouTube video. But “news reporting” aspect of fair use can be tricky.

An embattled California pastor sent a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube over a video clip that a blogger used “to report accurately the relationship” between two organizations. The blogger sent a counternotification and explained that he believes copyright fair use protects him against the takedown (and apparently against infringement as well).

The blogger invokes, among other things, the news reporting aspect of fair use, which one finds set forth in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. A recent fair use case, Swatch Group Management Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg, 742 F. 3d 17 (2d Cir. 2014) might shed some interesting light on how news reporting plays into the analysis. In that case, the court found that defendant was protected by fair use when it distributed an audio recording of a company’s earnings call. Unlike many fair use cases, in which the analysis under the first factor (purpose and character of the use) becomes a question of whether the subsequent use is “transformative,” the court observes the following:

In the context of news reporting and analogous activities … the need to convey information to the public accurately may in some instances make it desirable and consonant with copyright law for a defendant to faithfully reproduce an original work rather than transform it.

A defendant may in some circumstances provide transformative material along with the faithful reproduction of an original work. But the absence of that transformative material will not disqualify a defendant from showing fair use:

[B]y disseminating not just a written transcript or article but an actual sound recording, [defendant] was able to convey with precision not only what [plaintiff's] executives said, but also how they said it. This latter type of information may be just as valuable … as the former, since a speaker’s demeanor, tone, and cadence can often elucidate his or her true beliefs far beyond what a stale transcript or summary can show.

So we see that the news reporting aspect of fair use can be conceptually separated from transformative use.

There is a slippery slope risk here, and the court recognized that. It cited to the Supreme Court’s Harper & Row decision to observe that “[t]he promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by dubbing the infringement a fair use ‘news report’”. In this case, however, the “independent informational value inherent in a faithful recording” carried the day. From this we see a rule or guide: use of a piece of content is more likely to be newsworthy if the piece of content itself, and not just the raw information within the content, is a news event.

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with technology, the internet and new media.

When is it okay to use social media to make fun of people?

There is news from California that discusses a Facebook page called 530 Fatties that was created to collect photos of and poke fun at obese people. It’s a rude project, and sets the context for discussing some intriguing legal and normative issues.

Apparently the site collects photos that are taken in public. One generally doesn’t have a privacy interest in being photographed while in public places. And that seems pretty straightforward if you stop and think about it — you’re in public after all. But should technology change that legal analysis? Mobile devices with good cameras connected to high speed broadband networks make creation, sharing and shaming much easier than it used to be. A population equipped with these means essentially turns all public space into a panopticon. Does that mean the individual should be given more of something-like-privacy when in public? If you think that’s crazy, consider it in light of what Justice Sotomayor wrote in her concurrence in the 2012 case of U.S. v. Jones: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables [one] to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”

Apart from privacy harms, what else is at play here? For the same reasons that mobile cameras + social media jeopardizes traditional privacy assurances, the combination can magnify the emotional harms against a person. The public shaming that modern technology occasions can inflict deeper wounds because of the greater spatial and temporal characteristics of the medium. One can now easily distribute a photo or other content to countless individuals, and since the web means the end of forgetting, that content may be around for much longer than the typical human memory.

Against these concerns are the free speech interests of the speaking parties. In the U.S. especially, it’s hardwired into our sensibilities that each of us has great freedom to speak and otherwise express ourselves. The traditional First Amendment analysis will protect speech — even if it offends — unless there is something truly unlawful about it. For example, there is no free speech right to defame, to distribute obscene materials, or to use “fighting words.” Certain forms of harassment fall into the category of unprotected speech. How should we examine the role that technology plays in moving what would otherwise be playground-like bullying (like calling someone a fatty) to unlawful speech that can subject one to civil or even criminal liability? Is the impact that technology’s use makes even a valid issue to discuss?

Finally, we should examine the responsibility of the intermediaries here. A social media platform generally is going to be protected by the Communications Decency Act at 47 USC 230 from liability for third party content. But we should discuss the roles of the intermediary in terms other than pure legal ones. Many social media platforms are proactive in taking down otherwise lawful content that has the tendency to offend. The pervasiveness of social media underscores the power that these platforms have to shape normative values around what is appropriate behavior among individuals. This power is indeed potentially greater than any legal or governmental power to constrain the generation and distribution of content.

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with technology, the internet and new media.

DMCA’s protection of copyright management information applied to non-electronic works

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) provides safe harbors from copyright infringement liability for online service providers (17 U.S.C. 512) and makes it unlawful to circumvent technological measures that effectively control access to copyrighted works (17 U.S.C. 1201). A lesser-known (and lesser-litigated) provision of the DMCA (17 U.S.C. 1202) makes it illegal to intentionally remove or alter any copyright management information or to distribute copies of works knowing that copyright information has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law. “Copyright management information” includes information conveyed in connection with copies of the work, such as the title and the name of the author.

A recent case from federal court in Florida considered whether this regulation of copyright management information in the DMCA applies only to electronic works intended for distribution over the internet, or whether it applies to more traditional works such as hard copy technical drawings. The court interpreted the DMCA broadly to apply to all kinds of works, whether on the internet or not.

Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated the DMCA by distributing copies of plaintiff’s drawings “knowing that [plaintiff’s] name had been removed therefrom and/or that another entity’s name had been added thereto.” Defendant argued that plaintiff failed to state a claim for a violation of the DMCA because the DMCA only applies to “technological” infringement. Defendant cited to Textile Secrets Intl’l, Inc. v. Ya–Ya Brand, Inc., 524 F.Supp.2d 1184 (C.D.Cal.2007), which found that § 1202(b) “was [not] intended to apply to circumstances that have no relation to the Internet, electronic commerce, automated copyright protections, or management systems, public registers, or other technological measures or processes as contemplated in the DMCA as a whole.” To read it otherwise, the court in that case reasoned, would contradict the “legislative intent behind the DMCA to facilitate electronic and Internet commerce.”

In this case, however, the court noted that other courts, focusing on the plain language of the DMCA, have held differently, and approved the DMCA’s application to non-technological contexts. See Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir.2011); Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F.Supp.2d 295 (S.D.N.Y.2011). Although in this case, as in Murphy, the legislative history of the DMCA was consistent with defendant’s interpretation, it did not actually contradict it. Instead, Section 1202(b) simply established a cause of action for the removal of, among other things, the name of the author of a work when it has been conveyed in connection with copies of the work.

So the court, as it found it was required to do, considered the statute’s plain meaning before it considered its legislative history. Under that analysis, it held that plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to a state a claim for violation of the DMCA.

Roof & Rack Products, Inc. v. GYB Investors, LLC, 2014 WL 3183278 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with copyright, technology, the internet and new media.

Is the Aereo decision a setback for innovation?

I have written about last week’s Aereo decision over on my firm’s blog:

One of the big questions preceding the Supreme Court’s decision in the Aereo case … was whether a holding against Aereo would put cloud services into such a legally precarious position that the innovation and investment climate would chill. While the decision clearly makes Aereo’s use of its technology illegal, one should not be too quick to foretell a drastic impact on all hosted services. Here are some reasons why. [Read the entire post]

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with technology, the internet and new media.

No Section 230 immunity for healthcare software provider

Company could be liable for modifications made to its software that provided abbreviated third-party warnings for prescription drugs.

Cases dealing with the Communications Decency Act often involve websites. See, for example, the recent decision from the Sixth Circuit involving thedirty.com, and earlier cases about Roommates.com and Amazon. But this case considered a sort of unique suggested application of Section 230 immunity. The question was whether a provider of software that facilitated the delivery of prescription monographs (including warning information) could claim immunity. It’s unusual for Section 230 to show up in a products liability/personal injury action, but that is how it happened here.

Plaintiff suffered blindness and other injuries allegedly from taking medication she says she would not have taken had it been accompanied with certain warnings. She sued several defendants, including a software company that provided the technology whereby warnings drafted by third parties were provided to pharmacy retailers.

Defendant software company moved to dismiss on several grounds, including immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and defendant sought review. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that Section 230 immunity did not apply.

At the request of the retailer that sold plaintiff her medicine, defendant software company modified its software to provide only abbreviated product warnings. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant arose from that modification.

Defendant argued that Section 230 immunity should protect it because defendant did not play any role in the decisions of the product warning. Instead, defendant was an independent provider of software that distributed drug information to pharmacy customers. Its software enabled pharmacies to access a third party’s database of product warnings. Defendant did not author the warnings but instead, provided the information under an authorization in a data license agreement. Defendant thus functioned as a pass through entity to distribute warnings that were prepared by third parties to retailers selling prescription drugs, and were printed and distributed to the individual customer when a prescription was filled.

The court found unpersuasive defendant’s claim that Section 230 immunized it from liability for providing electronic access to third party warnings. Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that (1) “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” and (2) “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local rule that is inconsistent with this section.”

It held that plaintiff’s claim against defendant did not arise from defendant’s role as the software or service provider that enabled the retailer to access the third-party drafted warnings. Instead, the court found that plaintiff’s claim arose from defendant’s modification of its software to allow the retailer to distribute abbreviated drug monographs that automatically omitted warnings of serious risks. The appellate court agreed with the trial court which found, “this is not a case in which a defendant merely distributed information from a third party author or publisher.” Instead, in the court’s view, defendant’s conduct in modifying the software so that only abbreviated warnings would appear, it participated in creating or modifying the content.

Hardin v. PDX, Inc., 2014 WL 2768863 (Cal. App. 1st June 19, 2014)

Sixth Circuit holds thedirty.com entitled to Section 230 immunity

Plaintiff Jones (a high school teacher and Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader) sued the website thedirty.com and its operator for defamation over a number of third party posts that said mean things about plaintiff. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Communications Decency Act — 47 USC § 230(c)(1) — afforded them immunity from liability for the content created by third parties. Articulating a “goofy legal standard,” the district court denied the motion, and the case was tried twice. The first trial ended in a mistrial, and the second time the jury found in favor of plaintiff.

Defendants sought review with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on the issue of whether whether the district court erred in denying defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law by holding that the CDA did not bar plaintiff’s state tort claims. On appeal, the court reversed the district court and ordered that judgment as a matter of law be entered in defendants’ favor.

Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” At its core, § 230 grants immunity to defendant service providers in lawsuits seeking to hold the service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.

But the grant of immunity is not without limits. It applies only to the extent that an interactive computer service provider is not also the information content provider of the content at issue. A defendant is not entitled to protection from claims based on the publication of information if the defendant is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of the information.

The district court held that “a website owner who intentionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party postings to which he adds his own comments ratifying or adopting the posts becomes a ‘creator’ or ‘developer’ of that content and is not entitled to immunity.” Thus, the district court concluded that “[d]efendants, when they re-published the matters in evidence, had the same duties and liabilities for re-publishing libelous material as the author of such materials.”

The appellate court held that the district court’s test for what constitutes “creation” or “development” was too broad. Instead, the court looked to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) and adopted the material contribution test from that opinion:

[W]e interpret the term “development” as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.

In the Sixth Circuit’s language, “[A] material contribution to the alleged illegality of the content does not mean merely taking action that is necessary to the display of allegedly illegal content. Rather, it means being responsible for what makes the displayed content allegedly unlawful.”

In this case, the defendants did not author the statements at issue. But they did select the statements for publication. The court held that defendants did not materially contribute to the defamatory content of the statements simply because those posts were selected for publication. Moreover, the website did not require users to post illegal or actionable content as a condition of use. The website’s content submission form simply instructed users generally to submit content. The court found the tool to be neutral (both in orientation and design) as to what third parties submit. Accordingly, the website design did not constitute a material contribution to any defamatory speech that was uploaded.

Jones v. Dirty World, No. 13-5946 (6th Cir. June 16, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago advising clients on matters dealing with technology, the internet and new media. Contact him.

Tweet served as evidence of initial interest confusion in trade dress case

The maker of KIND bars sued the maker of Clif bars alleging that the packaging of the Clif MOJO bar infringes the trade dress used for KIND bars. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, but the court denied the motion. But in its analysis, the court considered the relevance of a Twitter user’s impression of the products. Plaintiff submitted a tweet as evidence in which a the user wrote, “I was about to pick up one of those [Clif MOJO bars] because I thought it was a Kind Bar at the vitamin shop ….” The court found that this type of initial interest confusion was actionable and therefore the tweet supported plaintiff’s argument.

KIND LLC v. Clif Bar & Company, 2014 WL 2619817 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago, advising clients on matters dealing with trademark protection and enforcement, technology, the internet and new media. Contact him.

No infringement means no injunction in software dispute

Former members of a limited liability company, who participated in the development of four pieces of software while a part of the company, sued the LLC and its remaining members for copyright infringement. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ infringement claims must fail because defendants had not used the allegedly copyrighted software outside of the licensing agreements the LLC signed while plaintiffs were still with the company. The court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Plaintiffs agreed that the software had not been used outside the license agreements with companies the LLC had entered while plaintiffs were with the company. But plaintiffs still sought injunctive relief with respect to their infringement claims.

To demonstrate copyright infringement, plaintiffs were required to prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991)). In this case, plaintiffs essentially conceded that the second element of the Feist test was not met.

The court cited Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d. Cir.2010)) to note that in the second Feist element, “the word copying is shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright owner’s five exclusive rights described in 17 U.S.C. § 106”. Those exclusive rights allow the owner to: (1) reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) distribute copies of the copyrighted work; (4) perform the work publicly; and (5) display the copyrighted work. Because plaintiffs conceded that defendants had not used the software outside of the license agreements with its customers that were made while plaintiffs were still a part of the LLC, defendants had not infringed on plaintiffs purported exclusive rights.

Plaintiffs nevertheless claimed that they were entitled to injunctive relief to prevent defendants’ potential future use of the copyrighted software. Plaintiffs were required to show that: (1) they had suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies at law were inadequate to compensate that injury; (3) that the balance of hardships warranted a remedy in equity in favor of plaintiffs; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Here, plaintiffs conceded that they had not suffered an injury – the copyrights had not been infringed. Instead, plaintiffs were arguing for a prospective injunction to prevent defendants from infringing upon a copyright for which there was no evidence defendants intended to infringe. The court denied the injunction, holding that a prospective injunction could be entered only on the basis of current, ongoing conduct that threatened future harm.

Brightharbour Consulting, LLC v. Docuconsulting, LLC, 2014 WL 1415186 (N.D.Ga. April 14, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago, advising clients in technology transactions, intellectual property disputes, and other matters involving the internet and new media.

Limitation of liability clause in software license agreement did not excuse customer from paying fees

Customer did not like how software it had bought performed, so it stopped paying. Vendor sued for breach of contract, and customer argued that the agreement capped its liability at $5,000. Both parties moved for summary judgment on what the following language from the agreement meant:

NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY, THE TOTAL DOLLAR LIABILITY OF EITHER PARTY UNDER THIS AGREEMENT OR OTHERWISE SHALL BE LIMITED TO U.S. $5,000.

Customer argued that the sentence meant what it said, namely, that customer would not be liable for anything over $5,000. But the court read otherwise, holding that construe the language as excusing customer’s payment of fees would render those provisions calling for fees (which were much more that $5,000) meaningless.

The court observed that when parties use the clause “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein” in a paragraph of their contract, they contemplate the possibility that other parts of their contract may conflict with that paragraph, and they agree that the paragraph must be given effect regardless of any contrary provisions of the contract.

In this situation, the $5,000 limitation language was the last sentence of a much longer provision dealing with limitations of liability in the event the software failed to function properly. The court held that the rule about “notwithstanding anything to the contrary” applies if there is an irreconcilable difference between the paragraph in which that statement is contained and the rest of the agreement.

There was no such irreconcilable difference here. On the contrary, reading in such difference would have rendered the other extensive provisions dealing with payment of goods and services meaningless, which would have violated a key canon of construction.

IHR Sec., LLC v. Innovative Business Software, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2014 WL 1057306 (Tex.App. El Paso March 19, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago, advising clients on matters dealing with software licensing, technology, the internet and new media.

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In software dispute, court enforces forum selection clause and transfers case from California to Michigan

Though parties often think of forum selection clauses as throwaway “boilerplate” language, a recent case demonstrates the influence such a clause can have on where litigation takes place.

Plaintiff sued defendant in California for fraud and other claims relating to the alleged defective performance of electronic medical records software. Defendant moved to transfer the matter to federal court in Michigan, based on a forum selection clause in the agreement that provided, in relevant part, that “[a]ny and all litigation arising from or relating to this Agreement will be filed and prosecuted before any court of competent subject matter jurisdiction in the State of Michigan.” Plaintiff objected to the motion, arguing that enforcement would violate California public policy in a number of ways. The court rejected plaintiff’s arguments and granted the motion to transfer.

Plaintiff argued that transfer would go against California’s public policy against unfair business practices, and would also be against the policy of incentivizing medical providers to adopt electronic medical records systems. The court rejected these arguments because plaintiff’s motion dealt with venue, i.e., where the lawsuit would occur, not which substantive law would apply. Given that the potential existed for the federal court in Michigan to consider whether California law should apply, transferring the case would not cut against public policy.

The court further rejected plaintiff’s argument that the forum selection clause was unconscionable, given that plaintiff did not dispute that she read the clause, and was a sophisticated party. Moreover, citing to language of the Supreme Court on the issue, the court refused to consider arguments about the parties’ private interests. “When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.”

East Bay Women’s Health, Inc. v. gloStream, Inc., 2014 WL 1618382 (N.D.Cal. April 21, 2014)

Evan Brown is an attorney in Chicago, advising clients on matters dealing with technology, the internet and new media. Follow him on Twitter @internetcases

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[This is a cross post from the InfoLawGroup blog.]