More evidence needed for YouTube’s DMCA defense

June 26, 2007 | by Evan Brown (@internetcases) | Comments Off 

Viacom’s lawsuit against YouTube has gotten quite a bit of attention, but it wasn’t the first case of its kind filed. Almost a year ago, helicopter pilot and journalist Robert Tur sued YouTube for infringement of some well-known video he shot during the Rodney King Riots.

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and last week the court denied both motions. The rulings shed some light on how the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) may play out in future lawsuits over user-generated content.

YouTube argued in its motion that it qualified for safe harbor protection “based on what it purport[ed] to be its definitive ability to satisfy all of the requirements of the statutory scheme.” The court neatly parsed seven requirements from 17 U.S.C. ยง512 that a service provider must meet to sail into the safe harbor:

(1) adoption and reasonable implementation of a termination policy for subscribers and account holders who are repeat infringers;

(2) accommodation and non-interference with “standard technical measures” that copyright owners use to protect their works;

(3) infringement is “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider”;

(4) lack of actual knowledge of the infringing material or no awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent on the system or network, and expeditious action to remove or disable access to material upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness;

(5) no “financial benefit” directly attributable to the infringing activity,” if it had “the right and ability to control such activity”;

(6) expeditious response to remove or disable access to infringing material upon notification from the copyright owner; and

(7) proper designation of an agent to receive such notification.

The difficulty arose for YouTube under the fifth point, namely, in connection with its argument that it gained no “financial benefit” directly attributable to the infringing activity,” and did not have “the right and ability to control such activity.”

Citing to the recent 9th Circuit case of Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the court observed that this point is actually two requirements in one: a provider’s receipt of a financial benefit is only implicated where it also has the right and ability to control the infringing activity. So if YouTube did not have the right and ability to control the alleged infringing activity, there was no reason to engage in the “financial benefit” analysis.

The court held that there was insufficient evidence to allow it to determine whether YouTube had the right and ability to control the infringing activity. The court’s comments on this point are intriguing, and foreshadow what might be some interesting issues in discovery. “There is clearly a significant amount of maintenance and management that YouTube exerts over its website, but the nature and extent of that management is unclear.” The court went on to note the lack of evidence as to “the process undertaken by YouTube from the time a user submits a video clip to the point of display on the YouTube website.”

Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. 06-4436, (C.D.Cal. June 20, 2007)

Massachusetts can’t prosecute posting of illegal web video

June 25, 2007 | by Evan Brown (@internetcases) | Comments Off 

The recent case of Jean v. Massachusetts State Police addressed the question of whether the First Amendment prevents law enforcement officials from interfering with an individual’s Internet posting of an audio and video recording of an arrest and warrantless search of a private residence, when the individual who posted the recording had reason to know at the time she accepted the recording that it was illegally recorded.

Mary T. Jean operated a website critical of her community’s former district attorney. One of the visitors to her site contacted her, and sent a videotape of eight Massachusetts state police officers conducting a warrantless search of the visitor’s home. The video was made by a “nanny cam” in the home.

After Jean was threatened with criminal prosecution under the state’s wiretap law, she sought a temporary restraining order against the police and the attorney general, to prevent her from being arrested. The lower court granted the motion, relying on the Supreme Court case of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001).

It held that Jean had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim, that irreparable harm would result from the absence of an injunction, and that the balance of burdens and public interests weighed in her favor. The court noted that although the tape may have been recorded in violation of the state law, Jean played no part in the recording of the video, she had “obtained the tape lawfully,” and the videotape related to a “matter of public concern.”

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the entry of the temporary restraining order. It found the case “materially indistinguishable” from Bartnicki, concluding that publication of the video was entitled to First Amendment protection.

Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, — F.3d —-, 2007 WL 1793126 (1st Cir. June 22,2007)

The $64,000 question: should you ignore Ron Coleman’s client?

June 21, 2007 | by Evan Brown (@internetcases) | Comments Off 

No.

Defendant Nyarko turned a deaf ear on Plaintiff Burch’s demands that Nyarko pay Burch a licensing fee for the use on Nyarko’s website of four photos Burch took in Ghana. In fact, Burch claimed that Nyarko got pretty angry when Burch asked him for payment. So Burch sued for copyright infringement, and won.

Nyarko ignored the suit as well, so the court entered a default judgment. Then it came time to prove up the damages. This was all done on paper. Burch submitted some documents showing that he’d lost some revenue through the unauthorized use, and his attorneys submitted a declaration talking about how much Burch had spent on fees and court costs.

The court could have awarded up to $600,000 in statutory damages, because the copyrights in the photos were registered in time. So in a certain sense, you might consider Nyarko lucky when the court slapped him with a judgment of about $64,000, reflecting an award of $60,000 in statutory damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs.

The court looked at a number of factors to arrive at the amount of the award. Part of the basis was the fact Nyarko hadn’t been cooperative in the dispute. Another reason was because of the lost revenue Burch suffered. And the fact that the court found it necessary to deter others from ripping off other people’s works probably played some part in it as well. If there’s one thing to learn from the case, it’s to not be too flippant when an able attorney’s client tells you to pay up.

Burch v. Nyarko, No. 06-7022, 2007 WL 1732401 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2007).

Viral: Episode 25

June 16, 2007 | by Evan Brown (@internetcases) | Comments Off 

I’m in this week’s episode of Viral on Veoh, talking about Creative Commons.


Online Videos by Veoh.com

Click here if you can’t see the embedded video.

“Counterfeit orders” alleged to give rise to copyright infringement

June 12, 2007 | by Evan Brown (@internetcases) | Comments Off 

Hackers accused of unlawful distribution of copyrighted works

DeVry/Becker Educational Development Corp. produces materials used by persons studying for the CPA exam. It maintains a database which it uses to track and process orders of the copyrighted study materials. DeVry has filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois [No. 07-3280 -- download the complaint here], alleging that a number of John Doe defendants accessed the database and caused unauthorized orders to be shipped to residences in New York and Pennsylvania.

Not surprisingly, the complaint alleges common law fraud and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [18 U.S.C. 1030], which prohibits unauthorized access to certain computer systems. The more creative claims, however, are for copyright infringement.

DeVry’s theory is that by causing the delivery of the study materials, the John Doe defendants engaged in an unauthorized distribution of the copyrighted works. It’s an interesting theory, and it raises some conceptual issues as to what “distribution” means. The complaint (e.g. at paragraph 52) says that DeVry is the one who (relying on the “counterfeit orders”), sent the course materials. It will be interesting to see whether one who is doing the sending can be different than the one doing the distributing.

DeVry Becker Ed. Dev. Corp. v. Does 1-10, No. 07-3280 (N.D. Ill., filed June 11, 2007).

Back to basics on open source

June 6, 2007 | by Evan Brown (@internetcases) | Comments Off 

The new version of the GPL (v3) is on its way, and what better time than now to revisit some of the principles underlying open source software. While brushing up on open source concepts, I found this concise yet intelligent rundown of open source issues with an uncommon look at the downside. It’s published by the American Bar Association, so it’s gotta be good. I’m not sure how old it is (how hard would it have been to put a publication date on it?), but it’s clearly still relevant.