Ohio internet obscenity statute constitutional

American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Strickland, — F.3d —, 2010 WL 1488123 (6th Cir. April 15, 2010)

Court holds that statute prohibiting distribution of material harmful to minors directly via the internet is not overly broad and therefore not unconstitutional.

Ohio has a statute that criminalizes sending juveniles material that is harmful to those juveniles (ORC 2907.31). Section D of that statute specifically addresses communications “by means of an electronic method of remotely transmitting information.”

A group of booksellers and publishers challenged this statute on First Amendmendment grounds, arguing that the provisions are overly broad. After a complex procedural journey that began in 2002, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the statute is not unconstitutional.

The court held that the statute was not overly broad because it only apllies to personally directed communications. For that reason, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate from the text of the statute that a “substantial number of instances exist in which the law cannot be applied constitutionally.”

Unlike a typical First Amendment case, the court did not apply the “strict scrutiny” test for constitutionality, because the statute does not affect protected speech among adults. But the court noted that even if that test applied, it would have survived strict scrutiny, given the compelling interests in protecting children from predators.

(Photo: Derived from an image licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike (2.0) from iboy’s photostream)

Is banning sex offenders from social networking sites constitutional?

Mashable and others are reporting on a law that the governor of Illinois signed earlier this week, banning use of social networking sites by convicted sex offenders. The big criticism of that law seems to be that it may be unconstitutional. That question is worth thinking about.

The most likely constitutional challenge will be that the law is too broad. For a law to prohibit certain speech and not run afoul of the First Amendment, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Clearly there is a compelling government interest in protecting children and other victims of sex crimes from perpetrators. So the real analysis comes from examining whether this restriction on the use of social networking sites is narrowly tailored to serve that purpose.

What the law says

Let’s back up and take a look at what the new law actually says. In short, it requires any sex offender that is on parole, supervised release, probation, conditional release or court supervision to “refrain from accessing or using a social networking website.” Note that the restriction is not a lifetime ban, but just a restriction to be in effect during the sentence.

There are a number of terms to unpack.

There is a prohibition on “accessing” and “using.” This is kind of redundant, because the statute defines “access” as “to use, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, or otherwise utilize any services of a computer.” (The redundant part comes from the fact that to “use” is part of the definition of “access”.)

The most important definition for our discussion is that of a “social networking website”:

“Social networking website” means an Internet website containing profile web pages of the members of the website that include the names or nicknames of such members, photographs placed on the profile web pages by such members, or any other personal or personally identifying information about such members and links to other profile web pages on social networking websites of friends or associates of such members that can be accessed by other members or visitors to the website. A social networking website provides members of or visitors to such website the ability to leave messages or comments on the profile web page that are visible to all or some visitors to the profile web page and may also include a form of electronic mail for members of the social networking website.

This is a tortured definition plagued by a couple of runon sentences, but in essence, a social networking website, as defined under Illinois law, is any site that has:

  • profile pages that contain
  • identifying information such as names, usernames or photographs, and which are
  • linked to other profile pages of “friends or associates” that can be
  • accessed by other members or visitors to the website, and
  • provides the ability to leave messages or comments on the profile visible to others

In a rather strange style for legislative writing, the definition says that a social networking site “may also include” direct messaging. That’s weird to say in a statute — does it have to include direct messaging to be considered a social networking site? One could argue either way. So that part of the definition does nothing to assist.

How one can run afoul of the law

By merely accessing a social networking site, a sex offender violates this new law. He or she doesn’t have to actually use any of the social networking functionality, all that is necessary is to merely retrieve data from the computer on which the site is stored. Clearly it would be verboten to use MySpace and Facebook. But also off limits would be LinkedIn and Focus. Flickr? YouTube? No way, even if the offender is just going there to passively view content for completely benign purposes.

The constitutional problem

Remember, the law has to be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest. That means that if there is some less restrictive alternative than the law as enacted to fix the problem, the law is too broad and therefore unconstitutional. It would certainly seem that there is something less restrictive than a prohibition on merely visiting a website with social media functionality. A good start would be more aggressively targeting the actual online conduct that might put people at risk — actual online interaction through social media.

But it is far from clear. The Seventh Circuit (which is the federal appellate court that would hear a constitutional challenge to an Illinois law) has held that a convicted sex offender can lawfully be prohibited from visiting a city park. See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th. Cir. 2004). In a city park there is plenty of conduct one can undertake which is not unlawful or does not threaten others. And the court held that restriction was not unconstitutional. There is plenty of conduct one can engage in on a “social networking site” as defined by the statute that is not harmful as well.

Is the comparison between a city park and a social networking site justified?

Keyboard image courtesy Flickr user striatic under this Creative Commons License.

My Public Radio debut

Had a great time talking about anonymity and the First Amendment with Sheilah Kast of Baltimore’s 88.1 FM WYPR on today’s Maryland Morning. I talked about the court’s analysis in the recent case of Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie (which I wrote about here).

Listen to the interview here:

Audio clip: Adobe Flash Player (version 9 or above) is required to play this audio clip. Download the latest version here. You also need to have JavaScript enabled in your browser.

Maryland Court of Appeals addresses important question of internet anonymity

Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, — A.2d —, 2009 WL 484956 (Md. February 27, 2009)

Maryland’s highest state court has issued a comprehensive opinion setting out the proper framework trial courts should use when evaluating whether a plaintiff should be permitted to learn the identity of an anonymous (or pseudonymous) internet speaker. After considering the varying standards courts across the country have applied in balancing the First Amendment right to anonymity against the right of a plaintiff to seek redress, the court adopted, in large part, the standard put forth in the New Jersey case of Dendrite, Int’l. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) which requires, among other things, a prima facie showing by the plaintiff before compulsory discovery concerning the identity of an unknown defendant will be had.

One of the great things about the internet is that users can easily speak anonymously or through a pseudonym. This right to remain unidentified is a free speech right guaranteed by the First Amendment. But that right has limits which start to show when an anonymous speaker goes too far by venturing from the realm of protected speech into that of unprotected defamation.

An aggrieved party going after an unknown defamer must first figure out who the defendant is. This usually involves a subpoena to the operator of the service through which the offending content was transmitted, to the unknown John Doe’s internet service provider, or both. This use of compulsory judicial process to reveal the identity of an unknown speaker pits the speaker’s First Amendment right to anonymity against the defamation plaintiff’s right to seek redress for the tort that has been committed.

It is up to the courts to weigh the competing interests so that:

  • a defendant’s First Amendment right to anonymity is not violated by wrongful compelled disclosure in connection with an unmeritorious case; while
  • aggrieved subjects of harmful defamatory speech are not deprived of the remedies due to them in a civil society.

This weighing of competing interests illustrates why the scale is a good metaphor for justice.

The Brodie case

Plaintiff Brodie learned that certain participants in an online forum board were saying negative things about him. Three users identified as “CorsicaRiver,” “Born & Raised Here” and “chatdusoleil” engaged in an online public conversation about Brodie’s sale of an historic farmhouse. Two other users, who went by the monikers “RockyRaccoonMD” and “Suze” criticized the way Brodie ran the local Dunkin Donuts shop.

Brodie sued Independent Newspapers (the operator of the forum) and John Does CorsicaRiver, Born & Raised Here and chatdusoleil for defamation. Absent from the list of defendants were RockyRaccoonMD and Suze.

Independent Newspapers moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that it was immune from suit under 47 U.S.C. §230. It also moved to quash the subpoena Brodie had served, which sought the identities of CorsicaRiver, Born & Raised Here and chatdusoleil. The court dismissed Independent Newspapers from the case, but ordered it to identify those three pseudonymous posters.

Immediately thereafter, Independent Newspapers asked the court to reconsider its order directing that the pseudonymous speakers be identified. The court granted that motion and dismissed the portion of the case dealing with the discussion of the historic farmhouse. The claims relating to the Dunkin Donuts stayed in, and the court required Independent Newspapers to disclose information concerning that.

Notwithstanding the fact that the farmhouse defamation claims had been tossed, Brodie sent a subpoena to Independent Newspapers seeking the identity of CorsicaRiver, Born & Raised Here, chatdusoleil, RockyRaccoonMD and Suze. Brodie also conceded that the only posters responsible for discussions about the Dunkin Donuts were RockyRaccoonMD and Suze. Independent Newspapers filed another motion to quash this subpoena which the court denied.

The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to hear the case. (Here’s some trivia for you: in Maryland, the Court of Appeals is the highest court. For some reason they don’t call it the Supreme Court.) On review, the court reversed the denial of the motion to quash. It held that Brodie did not have a sufficient claim of defamation against any of the pseudonymous speakers to justify revealing their actual identities.

Which standard applied

The court gave thorough and comprehensive analysis on the question of when it is appropriate for a trial court to order that an unknown defendant be unmasked. It recognized the important interests that must be balanced, and observed that courts have applied various standards regarding what a plaintiff must show before discovery of an unknown speaker will be permitted.

For example, the Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill put forth a rigorous requirement that in addition to providing notice of the discovery being sought, a plaintiff must come forward — at the pleading stage — with facts sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. Other courts, such as the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, have set the threshold lower. In Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999), the plaintiff was only required to plead facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

The New Jersey appellate court in Dendrite, Int’l. v. Doe took a more moderate approach. That court held that a plaintiff seeking the identification of an anonymous internet speaker must establish facts sufficient to maintain a prima facie case.

The Maryland court in the present case joined in the more moderate Dendrite approach, holding that when a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in which anonymous speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it should:

  • require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, including posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request on the message board;
  • withhold action to afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application;
  • require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech;
  • determine whether the complaint has set forth a prima facie defamation per se or per quod action against the anonymous posters; and
  • if all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster’s First Amendment right of free speech against the strength of the prima facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity, prior to ordering disclosure.

The Independent Newspapers case is an important case not necessarily because of any groundbreaking jurisprudence that it establishes, but because of the comprehensive way it treats the issue of unmasking unknown internet speakers. The opinion is a nearly exhaustive look at the current state of this question of law.

Anonymous photo courtesy Flickr user Neil Carey under this Creative Commons license.

Site operator successfully challenges subpoena which sought to unmask anonymous commenters

Enterline v. Pocono Medical Center, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. December 11, 2008)

A federal court in Pennsylvania has denied a motion demanding that a website operator turn over the identity of persons who commented anonymously in response to an article posted on the website. The court held that the website had standing to assert the free speech rights of the anonymous speakers, and that the First Amendment barred the unmasking where the information sought was available from other sources.

Plaintiff Enterline sued defendant Pocono Medical Center for sexual harassment and retaliation. On October 9, 2008, the local newspaper, The Pocono Record, published an article about the lawsuit. Several people left comments to the article, some of them claiming personal knowledge of facts possibly relevant to the case.

The Lovely Pocono Mountains
The Lovely Pocono Mountains

Enterline sent a subpoena to the newspaper seeking the identity of the anonymous commenters. When the newspaper wouldn’t respond, Enterline filed a motion to compel response to the subpoena. The newspaper responded by asserting a number of arguments. Among those arguments was that disclosure of the anonymous commenters’ identities would violate those persons’ First Amendment right to speak anonymously.

Siding with the newspaper, the court denied the motion.

The court first evaluated whether the newspaper website operator even had standing (i.e., the legal right) to assert the anonymous commenters’ First Amendment right. To answer this question in the affirmative, the court found that:

  • Practical obstacles prevented the anonymous commenters from asserting rights on their own behalf. The anonymity was the very right at stake. To defend that right, the commenters would have to be identified (setting aside for a moment the question of whether the commenters could appear as Doe defendants). The evaporation of that anonymity would lead to practical difficulties, as they had indicated they worked at the hospital or otherwise had personal connections with the litigants.
  • The anonymous commenters had sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the constitutional “case or controversy” requirement. Looking to such cases as RIAA v. Verizon, 257 F.Supp.2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003), the court agreed with the website operator, concluding that the relationship between the website and its readers was the type of relationship allowing it to assert the First Amendment rights of the anonymous commentators.
  • The website operator could reasonably be expected to properly frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal. There was little discussion on this point, as the plaintiff did not contest that the website operator would be an adequate advocate to assert the First Amendment rights of the anonymous visitors.

Finding that the website operator had standing to assert the rights of its anonymous commenters, the court next considered whether the identification of the anonymous speakers would violate the First Amendment. To evaluate this question, the court applied the factors set out in Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).

The court found that:

  • The subpoena was not brought in bad faith or for an improper purpose,
  • The information sought related to a core claim of the plaintiff,
  • The information was directly and materially relevant to the claim,
  • but that

  • Information required to prove the plaintiff’s claims was available from other sources. Several of the anonymous commenters stated that they were, for example, co-workers of the plaintiff or of the doctor against whom the plaintiff complained. The information these anonymous posters had could be uncovered through other discovery

This case is significant inasmuch as it could be applied to a case where a blogger or any other social media website operator is asked to turn over information that would identify its anonymous users. The decision outlines the framework that a blogger would have to use to show it has the right to argue on behalf of its anonymous visitors. The case then lays out (with the help of the 2TheMart.com decision) what must be shown after that initial threshold is crossed.

Photo of the Poconos courtesy Flickr user Nicholas T under this Creative Commons license.

Government spam blocking not a violation of First Amendment right to petition

Ferrone v. Onorato, No. 07-4299, 2008 WL 4763257 (3rd Cir. October 31, 2008)

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a county government did not violate a citizen’s First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of greivences when the county set its spam filters to block all email from the citizen’s domain. There was no evidence that such blocking was done with intent to deprive the citizen of his Constitutional rights, or with reckless disregard of those rights.

The founding fathers managed Spam
The Founding Fathers managed Spam

The Allegheny County, Pennsylvania office of economic devlopment was getting a lot of email from press@rock-port.com. A county official directed that his IT staff block all future messages sent from that address. Accidentally, however, the filter was set to block all messages from the @rock-port.com domain from being sent to any county account.

Plaintiff Ferrone, who was already in a dispute with the county, tried sending 14 email messages to various county officials over the course of five weeks. Because of the spam filter settings, the messages did not get through. So Ferrone sued, claiming a violation of the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievences. The county moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. Ferrone sought review with the Third Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed.

The court held that the First Amendment’s prohibition on the “abridgement” of the right to petition the government requires a plaintiff to show an actual intent on the part of the government to diminish this right. The court refused to accept Ferrone’s argument that the act of blocking email messages alone, without an examination of the government’s intent, would rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Rejecting Ferrone’s attempts to “plump” up his “specious claim” by throwing in the First Amendment, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could have found a violation of Constitutional rights.

No injunction against transferring student over violent YouTube video

O.Z. v. Board of Trustees of Long Beach Unified School Dist., 2008 WL 4396895 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008)

While school was out of session for spring break, seventh grader O.Z. collaborated with a classmate to make a slide show video dramatizing the murder of the students’ English teacher. Though O.Z. says she did not intend to share the slide show to anyone outside her home, she posted the video to YouTube. A couple months later, while doing a vanity search on YouTube, the English teacher encountered the video. Naturally distressed by the work, the teacher notified school authorities. Administrators suspended O.Z. and transferred her to a different school for her eighth grade year.

O.Z. filed suit and sought a preliminary injunction requiring the school district to re-enroll her at her former school. She argued that the slide show was protected speech under the First Amendment, and that the school’s discipline for it was unconstitutional. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.

In evaluating the likelihood of O.Z.’s success on her First Amendment claim, the court applied the standard set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Tinker test provides that discipline over student speech is appropriate if school officials reasonably conclude that the speech will “materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”

O.Z. argued that the slide show was merely a joke and not a true threat. But the court found that the school could reasonably forecast substantial disruption of school activities given the violent language and unusual photos comprising the video slide show. Further, the decision to transfer O.Z. served not only to discipline her, but to protect the safety of the teacher.

The fact that O.Z. created the slide show outside of school was of little import in the circumstances. Comparing the present situation with Wisniewski v. Board of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. School Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 2007) and other cases involving off-campus conduct, the court found that the slide show created a foreseeable risk of disruption within the school. Such a finding was no doubt influenced by the ability of social media platforms like YouTube to facilitate wide distribution of content.

Kentucky settles banned blogger’s First Amendment challenge to Internet filtering policy

Ed. note: This is a guest post by Greg Beck, an attorney at Public Citizen in Washington, DC. Greg works on a variety of issues at Public Citizen, mostly involving Internet free speech, anonymity, and intellectual property. He was lead counsel for Mark Nickolas in his challenge to Kentucky’s ban on blogs. [More info…]

Political blogger Mark Nickolas yesterday settled his lawsuit against Kentucky, in which he challenged the state’s policy of blocking blogs on state-owned computers. The settlement provides that Kentucky will no longer target websites for restriction just because they are blogs, and will instead treat them in the same way it treats other websites with similar content. In other words, classifying a website as a “blog” is no longer a good enough reason to ban a site on the state’s computers.

Nickolas is the owner and primary author of BluegrassReport.org, a blog focusing on Kentucky news and politics and specializing in criticism of former Governor Ernie Fletcher. In 2006, the New York Times quoted Nickolas and noted the blog in an article about Fletcher’s indictment on charges of political corruption. The next day, without warning, the state reconfigured its Webwasher filtering software to block all access to blogs on state computers.

Nickolas filed suit and, represented by Public Citizen, raised two primary arguments that the policy was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. First, he argued that the policy was adopted specifically to target his blog and therefore constituted viewpoint discrimination, the worst form of government action under the First Amendment. Aside from the suspicious timing of the policy, Nickolas relied on internal state email showing that, despite public claims to the contrary, the governor’s office had ordered the ban on blogs and had specifically requested that the URL of Nickolas’s site be added to the “blacklist.” Moreover, Nickolas obtained the declaration of the former state official charged with administering the state’s computer systems at the time the policy went into place, who was told that the decision to ban blogs came from “high up” and was designed to hide the decision to ban Nickolas’s site in “a bunch of other stuff.”

Second, Nickolas argued that, even if the ban were not aimed specifically at his site, the state nevertheless violated the First Amendment by singling out blogs for special restrictions while ignoring other sorts of websites with comparable content. State records showed that the number of hits to news and political blogs from state computers was a small fraction of the millions of hits received each day by mainstream news sites like the Lexington Herald-Leader, the New York Times, and CNN.com. The state could offer no rational explanation for its decision to focus solely on blogs while ignoring other websites reporting the same information (especially since even blogs on mainstream news sites remained accessible). Moreover, Kentucky continued to allow access to many other categories of websites that served no work-related purpose and that received more traffic than blogs, including webmail, newsgroups and message boards, sports sites, shopping sites, financial and stock-trading sites, and others.

The case was the first to challenge a state’s decision to block access to blogs on state-owned computers. The most analogous case is the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore, where several Virginia professors sued over a law prohibiting access on state computers to sexually explicit materials. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). The professors asserted that they needed access to the materials to fulfill their research, writing, and teaching responsibilities. That assertion, however, ultimately proved fatal to the professors’ claims when the court held that, because the professors were performing these duties in their capacities as state employees rather than as private citizens speaking on issues of public concern, their First Amendment rights were not implicated. Urofsky‘s reasoning suggests that if the professors had instead relied on restrictions to their personal use of state computers, the court would have evaluated the law’s constitutionality under the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering and a line of cases following it established a balancing test for determining the constitutionality of a government’s restrictions on its employees’ speech, weighing the employees’ First Amendment interest in access to the restricted materials against the employer’s interest in maintaining order in the workplace.

Unlike the professors in Urofsky, Nickolas did not challenge the state’s restrictions on what employees could read pursuant to their job-related responsibilities. Kentucky, like many other employers, had long allowed its employees to use state-owned computers for personal as well as work-related purposes as long as that use did not interfere with performance of job responsibilities. Pursuant to Kentucky’s policy, employees could and frequently did read online news sites, including blogs, from workplace computers. The state’s decision to block access to the blogs while still allowing access to other news sites imposed on its employees its own preferences about which sources of news were acceptable and which were not. Nickolas argued that, even if the state had the power to entirely ban personal use of workplace computers (a proposition that Nickolas did not dispute), it did not have the power to selectively allow access to only those news sites it approved as sources of news. It was simply not a proper role for government, Nickolas argued, to decide which websites were legitimate news sites and which were not.

In the settlement finalized yesterday, Kentucky reserved its right to regulate use of computers in the workplace, but agreed to do so in a viewpoint-neutral manner that treats blogs the same as equivalent non-blog websites. Although a decision on the legality of blog-banning policies will be left for another day, the case should at least cause public employers to think twice before cutting their employees off from a large and important piece of the online political discussion.

Discipline of student for personal blog post did not violate First Amendment

Post on LiveJournal blog in which student referred to administrators by a derogatory name and was intended to incite anger in administration was justification for disqualifying student from participating in upcoming election of class officers.

Doninger v. Niehoff, — F.3d —-, 2008 WL 2220680 (2nd Cir. May 29, 2008)

Toward the end of Avery Doninger’s junior year in high school in 2007, she became quite involved in planning the upcoming “Jamfest,” a battle of the bands held at her high school. After learning that school administrators were likely to postpone Jamfest, Avery collaborated with some of her classmates to raise attention concerning the postponement and to pressure the school administrators to rethink the schedule.

One of Avery’s pressure tactics was to post an entry to her LiveJournal blog in which she referred to the school administrators as “douchebags” and encouraged others to contact the school principal to “piss her off” more. Eventually, administrators discovered the blog post and decided that Avery should not be permitted to run for Senior Class Secretary.

Lewis Mills High School, where Avery Doninger attended

So her mother as guardian and next friend sued the school district alleging violation of Avery’s first amendment rights. She sought injunctive relief, asking the court to either redo the election or give Avery all the rights and privileges of the student that was duly elected as class secretary. The district court denied the preliminary injunction. Avery’s mother sought review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction.

The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for preliminary injunction, though the appellate court’s analysis was a bit different. Applying the standard in the seminal Tinker case (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)), the court held that keeping Avery out of the election was permissible. The blog post created a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within the school.

The case is unique in that it did not deal with content created at school or under the auspices of the classroom, but rather was created on Avery’s personal time, outside of school, on her own computer. But the “off-campus character” of the posting did “not necessarily insulate [Avery] from school discipline.”

The court found it was reasonably foreseeable that Avery’s post would reach school property because the content directly pertained to school events, its intent was to get students to read and respond, and Avery knew school community members were likely to read the post. Moreover, on the point of substantial disruption, the post contained offensive language, was misleading, and did not comport with the standard of conduct expected of a school government participant.

Other coverage:

Court lifts injunction off of Wikileaks

Court Lifts Injunction Against Web Site Accused of Posting Confidential Banking Documents

Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd v. Wikileaks, 535 F.Supp.2d 980, 2008 WL 554721 (N.D.Cal. February 29, 2008)

Switzerland-based Bank Julius Baer sued the Web site Wikileaks.org and the registrar of the domain name, and sought an injunction against the publication on the site of allegedly forged and confidential records of Bank Julius Baer customers. The court initially entered a permanent injunction agreed to between Julius Baer and the registrar, which called for a lockdown of the domain name’s registration. The court also, at first, entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Web site, restraining the “display, use or dissemination of the property identified by [Bank Julius Baer] as private, personal banking information of its clients.”

In the days following the entry of injunctive relief, numerous parties seeking to be amicus curiae provided the court with additional information concerning the matter. This additional information led the court to reconsider the entry of the permanent injunction and the TRO. In an order dated February 29, 2008, the court dissolved both orders and denied Julius Baer’s motion for entry of a preliminary injunction.

Among the factors guiding the decision were the First Amendment and the efficacy of any injunction concerning the allegedly confidential banking information. The court noted the important free speech issues implicated, including the right to receive information as “a necessary predicate to . . . meaningful exercise” of free speech. It expressed concern that the previous publication of confidential information meant that “the cat is out of the bag,” and thus an injunction would be ineffective in protecting the privacy rights of the bank’s clients.

Further, the court found that the injunction in place was not the least restrictive means to achieve the plaintiff’s goals, and thus should be dissolved. On this point, the court suggested that a constitutionally-permissible injunction would call for limited redaction of information, while permitting the non-confidential parts of the documents to be displayed online.

1 2 3 4 5