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April 3, 2008 Section 230, Uncategorized

How the Roommates.com decision is good for Section 230

Earlier today the Ninth Circuit, en banc, issued its opinion in the case of Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley, et al v. Roommate.com, LLC. It is a long and detailed opinion, authored by Judge Kozinski, and as characterized by my friend Michael Erdman, leaves Roommates.com largely unprotected by immunity under 47 U.S.C. 230. To learn everything you need to know about the majority opinion without actually reading the case, read Michael’s post here. There’s no need for me to duplicate efforts in summarizing the case, as there’s little I could add in that regard.

This case is pretty big news in Internet law circles, and more than one person has asked me today what my take on it is. I actually don’t have much to say about whether the Ninth Circuit got the legal analysis right. They probably did. Judge Kozinski and his colleagues in the majority are brighter hungover than I am at full stride, so I’m in no real position to critique their analysis. Instead, my take on the case is a pragmatic, and I shudder to say, a political one.

I hope you’ve taken my suggestion and read Erdman’s summary of the case before getting to this point in this post, because you need to know what the facts are. The subject matter dealt allegations of violation of the fair housing laws. That’s a touchy issue, involving race, religion, sexual orientation, family status, etc. Smart people don’t touch those kinds of issues with a ten foot pole.

Had the Ninth Circuit ruled in Roommates.com’s favor, think about the ways that outcome could have been spun. Imagine, shall we say, a “progressive” Congressman standing up in Washington and saying, hey, with this Section 230 scheme, we give a license to Web site operators to run hate mills, build up bastions of bigotry, and sanctuaries for racism. In short, a Roommates.com victory could have given a battalion’s worth of ammunition — in the form of emotional, irrational rhetoric — to Section 230’s critics. Some in Congress would have called for its head.

This didn’t dawn on me until the other day when I was talking with a very liberal colleague. He knew nothing of Section 230 other than what I had explained to him in the previous five minutes (including a mention of the Roommates.com 3-judge panel decision), and he said something to the effect of, “wow, when it starts touching on issues like fair housing, Congress is bound to step in and not give the Web sites a free ride.”

So maybe you see where I’m going with this. Whether it’s right or wrong from a legal analysis standpoint, today’s decision stands for the proposition that online systems alleged to facilitate the violation of some touchy rights don’t always get a free ride.

The real irony, and for me the “take” on the case, is that although Section 230 immunity appears to be diminished a bit by the decision (look at how few circuit court opinions there are where the defendant lost), the defense loss is really a bullet dodged. By declining to hold that Section 230 provided immunity, the Court kept Section 230’s neck off the political chopping block. What a tragedy it would be, indeed, for political issues to cause our Congress to roll back a provision that has been so integral to the development of the Internets.

April 2, 2008 Trademarks

Blackberry and Twitter in a trademark tussle?

In April 2007, Twitter, Inc. filed application no. 77166246 to register the trademark TWITTER with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. (Twitter is the ever-more-popular tool that enables “friends, family, and co–workers to communicate and stay connected through the exchange of quick, frequent answers to one simple question: What are you doing?” It’s fun. You should try it if you’re not using it already. And you can start by following me.)

Anyway, in February the application reached the point where it was published for opposition. That means that any other trademark owner out there who feels it would be damaged by the TWITTER mark being registered can oppose the application in the Trademark Office.

On March 14, 2008, Research in Motion (of Blackberry fame) stepped up and requested an extention of time to oppose the TWITTER application. I ran a quick search for registered marks owned by Research in Motion (you can do that yourself here), but didn’t see anything close to “Twitter”. Can anyone think of an unregistered mark that RIM owns that is similar to TWITTER? Or any other reason why RIM would want to oppose this application? Comments are open, as they have been for some time.

April 1, 2008 Section 230

No CDA immunity for adult-oriented Web site in right of publicity case

Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., — F.Supp.2d —-, No. 07-286, 2008 WL 803947 (D.N.H. March 28, 2008)

Plaintiff Doe learned that a nude image and some biographical information about herself had been used to set up a bogus profile on the adult-oriented personal-ad Web site Adult Friend Finder. She sued the operator of the site alleging a number of claims, like defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also alleged misappropriation of her right of publicity under state law, and false designation of origin and false advertising under the federal Lanham Act.

Adult Friend Finder moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) at 47 U.S.C. 230 immunized the site from liability for the information provided by someone other than the site operator. The court agreed with Adult Friend Finder as to the majority of the claims, holding that the claims were barred by the CDA where the plaintiff sought to impose liability on the site as the publisher or speaker of the information.

But the court held that the CDA did not immunize Adult Friend Finder from Doe’s state law claims for violation of the right of publicity, or for violation of the federal Lanham Act.

Section 230(e)(2) provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” You may recall that last year the Ninth Circuit [in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CC Bill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007)] held that 230(e)(2)’s restriction on immunity only applied to federal claims involving intellectual property (leaving state law claims barred).

The court in this case disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on this point, looking at the plain language of the statute and finding no meaningful distinction between state and federal causes of action involving intellectual property, especially given the presence of the word “any” when decribing “law[s] pertaining to intellectual property.”

March 31, 2008 Trademarks

1-800-SKI-VAIL found not to infringe VAIL ski resort mark

Vail Associates, Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., Ltd., — F.3d —-, 2008 WL 342272, (10th Cir. February 7, 2008)

[Brian Beckham is a contributor to Internet Cases and can be contacted at brian.beckham [at] gmail dot com.]

Vail Associates, owner of the incontestable service mark VAIL (which is used in connection with a wide variety of skiing and resort-related services), sued Vend-Tel-Co, the operator of the “1-800-SKI-VAIL” phone number, for infringement. After trial, the District Court entered judgment in Vend-Tel-Co’s favor, and Vail Associates sought review.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that use of Vend-Tel-Co’s “1-800-SKI-VAIL” mark (registered in 2001) was not likely to cause confusion with Vail Associates’s VAIL mark (registered in 1989).

Key to the appellate court’s decision was witness testimony from the proceedings. Vail Associates’s vice-president of marketing and sales testified that customers dialing the phone number would mistakenly think they were reaching Vail Associates, but acknowledged “hundreds of uses of the letters V-A-I-L in the names of [other] businesses in the Vail Valley.” As for the descriptive term “ski,” testimony from another witness revealed ownership of no less than 23 vanity phone numbers incorporating that term. Also important was the testimony of a travel agent who fielded calls to the number 1-800-SKI-VAIL. She testified that the typical caller would ask questions of a general nature (e.g., about products, directions, lift prices, ski conditions, etc.).

Vend-Tel-Co’s main witness, trademark attorney Kenneth Germain, testified that in the context of ski resorts, the VAIL mark was a “world renowned” strong mark, but that in the context of goods and services offered by businesses in the Vail area, it was weak (being geographically descriptive). Germain further testified that he did not deduce an intent to infringe (Vend-Tel-Co’s advertising materials promoted area businesses), and that use of the VAIL mark was a necessary, good faith component of the Vend-Tel-Co’s marketing activities.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Vail Associates, the Court of Appeals was satisfied that the District Court did not err in finding that consumers perceive the VAIL mark as referring to a particular geographic location, namely, a Colorado skiing destination. It held that Vail Associates failed to prove consumers associate the word “Vail” exclusively with its resort services.

As to the likelihood of confusion factors, the court found none favored Vail Associates. It observed that (1) Vail Associates offered little evidence of actual confusion, and the testimony reflected that consumers recognized Vail as a destination, not a specific service provider, (2) despite some showing of secondary meaning, the VAIL mark was found to be “not particularly strong”, (3) Vail Associates did not prove that in creating the phone number Vend-Tel-Co intended to deceive the public, trade on Vail Associates’s goodwill or reputation, or infringe its mark, (4) the marks were not similar in sight, sound, or meaning, (5) the parties’ services were not similar, but rather “symbiotic”, and were not marketed in a similar manner, or with similar connotations, and (6) consumers exercised great care in purchasing Vail Associates’s services which the court termed “first class accommodations at first class prices” in contrast to dialing a toll-free number.

The dissenting opinion offered that: (1) the marks were confusingly similar (indeed, the additional “1-800-SKI” elements furthered consumer confusion), (2) Vend-Tel-Co intended to trade on the goodwill and reputation of Vail Associates, (3) there was ample testimonial evidence of actual confusion (namely the travel agent’s testimony), (4) the services and their marketing “appeal to exactly the same class of consumers,” (5) despite care exercised by consumers in purchasing ski packages, there was significant, uncured initial interest confusion, and (6) VAIL is an incontestible descriptive mark whose strength was proven by evidence of secondary meaning, and that Vend-Tel-Co did not take VAIL out of the ski resort services context; instead, it emphasized that context with their choice of mark.

March 25, 2008 About This Site

New contributor to Internet Cases: Brian Beckham

I’m pleased to welcome Brian Beckham, the newest contributor to Internet Cases. Brian is currently based in Switzerland as a Case Manager with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center. He’s licensed to practice law in Virginia, and while he was practicing in the states, he focused on trademark law (as well as communications related contracts and licensing and nonprofit law) before joining WIPO in 2007. He holds a degree in philosophy from Ohio University, a J.D. and LL.M. in information technology from the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, and can often be found cycling the Alps surrounding Geneva, Switzerland. Drop him a line at brian.beckham [at] gmail.com. Although Brian works for WIPO, his posts are made in a personal capacity and recap publicly available information. Here’s a link to a more complete bio: http://jbrianbeckham.blogspot.com.

Brian’s first post deals with NASCAR’s unsuccessful attempts to wrangle a domain name from another party using the mark within a domain name.

March 25, 2008 Cybersquatting, Trademarks

NASCAR beat to checkered flag in domain name dispute

[Brian Beckham is a contributor to Internet Cases and can be contacted at brian.beckham [at] gmail dot com.]

Complainant NASCAR filed a complaint under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) against The Racin’ Connection, Inc. over the domain name nascartours.com. In the stock car racing business since 1948, NASCAR is a household name in U.S. motor sports. Its DAYTONA 500 attracted 30 million television viewers in 2007. NASCAR licensed its various marks to over 200 licensees to the tune of USD 2 billion in 2006. An entire industry revolves around providing tickets and packages to NASCAR-sanctioned events. One such entity, The Racin’ Connection, Inc. has provided such tour packages for over 30,000 customers in part through its website at the nascartours.com domain name since 1996.

NASCAR alleged in its complaint that the unlicensed domain name was confusingly similar to its NASCAR mark, that The Racin’ Connection, Inc. had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and that the domain name was registered and was being used in bad faith. NASCAR further asserted that use of its marks in a domain name (as opposed to on a website) was not a fair use, and that such use was intended to “entice…[and] misleadingly divert consumers for [] commercial gain.”

The Racin’ Connection, Inc. argued that the domain name was not confusingly similar to the NASCAR marks, but that its use of the marks was a fair use as part of a bona fide offering of services as a “race package reseller”. It further pointed out that it promoted only NASCAR events and displayed a disclaimer on its website.

Finding the The Racin’ Connection, Inc.’s argument of laches unavailing, the 3-member Panel found that the domain name was confusingly similar to the NASCAR mark. The Panel noted that there is a split in URPD cases regarding whether a bona fide offering of goods or services on a reseller’s (authorized or not) website using a mark in a domain name confers a legitimate interest on the reseller. In this case, the Panel found that The Racin’ Connection, Inc.’s use of the NASCAR mark in its domain name did confer such rights. (The Panel considered several factors from the previous Oki Data case paramount: The Racin’ Connection, Inc. was only offering NASCAR tours; the website disclosed the parties’ relationship; and the respondent did not try to “corner the market” in domain names incorporating the mark). Finally, the Panel found that The Racin’ Connection, Inc.’s sales of NASCAR tours since 1992 and disclaimer on its website coupled with a lack of evidence from NASCAR as to any actual consumer confusion negated a finding of bad faith in its registration or use of the domain name.

Ultimately, despite confusing similarity between the domain name and the NASCAR mark, given the good faith use of the mark in connection with a bona fide offering of services and the rights created thereby, NASCAR was not able to stop the use of its mark in a domain name.

The Full text of the Decision is available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-1524.html

March 20, 2008 Copyright

“Copyright misuse” not an independent cause of action

Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., — F.Supp.2d —-, 2008 WL 649788 (C. D. Cal. March 10, 2008)

Last October I wrote about a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in the case of Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc. You may recall that the court granted an injunction against RMG’s automated software that accessed Ticketmaster’s Web site, allegedly in violation of the DMCA anticircumvention provisions (17 U.S.C. §1201 et seq.) as well as the site’s terms of use. Because of such ruthless behavior on the part of RMG, some parents were evidently denied the chance to purchase Hannah Montana tickets for their daughters. (How can we be concerned about the economy or the war on terror when things like that are going on?)

RMG didn’t give up after last October’s injunction against it, but went on the offensive, filing a counterclaim against Ticketmaster alleging, among other things, copyright misuse. In general, the doctrine of copyright misuse prevents copyright holders from leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them control of areas outside that monopoly. Trying to extract a licensing fee for the use of a work in the public domain would be a clear example of copyright misuse.

The problem for RMG was that copyright misuse is a defense to an infringement action, not a cause of action in itself. And the court recognized that, citing to a number of cases, including:

  • Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming district court’s refusal to “extend [ ] the doctrine of copyright misuse beyond ‘its logical place as a defense to a claim of copyright infringement’ ”)
  • Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. American Medical Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.1997) (adopting rule that “misuse is a defense to copyright infringement”)
  • Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1225 (C.D.Cal.2003) (noting that, as even defendant conceded, “copyright misuse cannot found a claim for damages”)

Accordingly, the court granted Ticketmaster’s motion to dismiss the claim for copyright misuse. Leaving no uncertainty, the court continued by observing that because “this holding is not based on the way in which this claim was pled, but on the fact that no such claim can ever be pled, the dismissal of this claim is WITH PREJUDICE, as no possible amendment could save it.”

How’s that for black letter law?

March 19, 2008 Computer Crime

CD-ROM is not a computer

GWR Medical, Inc. v. Baez, No. 07-1103, 2008 WL 698995 (E.D.Pa. March 13, 2008)

Now there’s a revelation in that headline.

Plaintiff GWR Medical terminated defendant Baez’s position with the company. Baez took with him a CD-ROM containing training materials and, the company alleged, trade secrets. When Baez wouldn’t return the CD, GWR sued him in federal court for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §1030 et seq. (“CFAA”).

Baez moved to dismiss the CFAA claim, and the court granted the motion. It held that a CD-ROM did not meet the definition of “computer” under the CFAA, and thus the claim could not stand.

The CFAA provides, among other things, that “whoever intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains … information” violates the law. GWR asserted that Baez’s violation occurred when he kept the CD-ROM after he was terminated, thereby exceeding the authorization previously given to him.

A “computer” is defined in the CFAA [at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1)] as follows:

An electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device that performs logical, arithmetic or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or similar device.

Electrochemical? Say what? And thank goodness we don’t have to hear about CFAA lawsuits brought for sneaking in late at night to use the automated typewriter. Hey man, come back with my calculator!

In any event, the parties each presented expert testimony on the question of whether a CD-ROM constitutes a computer. The court parsed the definition into three requirements: (1) “[a]n electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device;” (2) “performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions;” which (3) “includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device.” If at least one of these requirements were not met, then the CD-ROM fell outside the definition.

Central to the court’s conclusion was the requirement that a computer process information. It found that the lack of the capacity to process information was fatal to GWR’s assertion that the CD-ROM met the statutory definition. Instead, the disc was analogous to a compilation of documents and training materials. Accordingly, the court dismissed the CFAA claim.

March 17, 2008 Uncategorized

Seventh Circuit sides with Craigslist in Section 230 case

The legal blogosphere is abuzz with last Friday’s ruling in the case of Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2008 WL 681168 (7th Cir. March 14, 2008). In a highly-anticipated opinion, Judge Easterbrook upheld the district court’s opinion, holding that under 47 U.S.C. 230, Craigslist could not be treated as the “publisher” of third party postings that allegedly violated the Fair Housing Act.

With life outside of blogging staying in the way of much of my activity here, I’m not going to be able to give the case any substantive analysis for awhile. And there’s a lot of quality information out there already on the case. Here are some links to just about everything you need to know about the opinion:

March 3, 2008 First Amendment

Court lifts injunction off of Wikileaks

Court Lifts Injunction Against Web Site Accused of Posting Confidential Banking Documents

Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd v. Wikileaks, 535 F.Supp.2d 980, 2008 WL 554721 (N.D.Cal. February 29, 2008)

Switzerland-based Bank Julius Baer sued the Web site Wikileaks.org and the registrar of the domain name, and sought an injunction against the publication on the site of allegedly forged and confidential records of Bank Julius Baer customers. The court initially entered a permanent injunction agreed to between Julius Baer and the registrar, which called for a lockdown of the domain name’s registration. The court also, at first, entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Web site, restraining the “display, use or dissemination of the property identified by [Bank Julius Baer] as private, personal banking information of its clients.”

In the days following the entry of injunctive relief, numerous parties seeking to be amicus curiae provided the court with additional information concerning the matter. This additional information led the court to reconsider the entry of the permanent injunction and the TRO. In an order dated February 29, 2008, the court dissolved both orders and denied Julius Baer’s motion for entry of a preliminary injunction.

Among the factors guiding the decision were the First Amendment and the efficacy of any injunction concerning the allegedly confidential banking information. The court noted the important free speech issues implicated, including the right to receive information as “a necessary predicate to . . . meaningful exercise” of free speech. It expressed concern that the previous publication of confidential information meant that “the cat is out of the bag,” and thus an injunction would be ineffective in protecting the privacy rights of the bank’s clients.

Further, the court found that the injunction in place was not the least restrictive means to achieve the plaintiff’s goals, and thus should be dissolved. On this point, the court suggested that a constitutionally-permissible injunction would call for limited redaction of information, while permitting the non-confidential parts of the documents to be displayed online.

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