State v. Noll, 2011 WL 2418895 (Ind. App. June 14, 2011) (Not selected for publication)
Defendant used a sexually explicit photo of the victim in an attempt to gain leverage in an intra-family dispute. She handed an envelope containing the photo to the victim, and indicated she would begin distributing the photo if certain demands were not met.
Defendant was convicted of intimidation under Indiana law. She sought review of her conviction. On appeal, the court affirmed.
One of the arguments that defendant made on appeal was that there was no intimidation because distribution of the photo to persons such as the victim’s husband or co-workers would not subject her to hatred, contempt, disgrace or ridicule as required by the Indiana statute. Defendant pointed out that the victim had posted the sexually explicit photo of herself at issue on the web five years earlier. So in essence, defendant argued, further distribution would do the victim no harm.
The court rejected this argument, finding:
The fact that [victim] already publicized the material herself certainly merits consideration, but is not alone determinative because publicizing material to a particular audience does not necessarily mean that further, targeted, publication would not lead to hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule. In other words, we consider [victim’s] posting of these photographs online in the past as it might mitigate reputational consequences of [defendant] mailing the photographs to others. Although internet websites are of an unusually public and long-lasting nature, we also recognize that making an obscure set of photographs available online is qualitatively different in nature from directly mailing the same photographs as hard-copies addressed to a particular individual or company. [Victim’s] husband or employer could have discovered [victim’s] prior internet posting of the photographs, but a direct mailing is certain to reach them.
The court similarly rejected defendant’s argument that because the victim had posted the photo on the web before, she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the photo and thus could not be the subject of intimidation. The court disagreed with the analogy to the Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy because in this case, the privacy interest was the victim’s, not the defendant’s. So use of such an analogy might “misdirect [the court] from the determinative issue of whether she would be exposed to reputational consequences.”