This case arose from some rather complex but interesting facts:
Defendant resigned from his job with an IT consulting firm. One of the firm’s customers hired defendant as an employee. Before the customer/new employer terminated the agreement with the IT consulting firm/former employer, defendant used the customer/new employer’s credentials to access and copy some scripts from the system. (Having the new employee and the scripts eliminated the need to have the consulting firm retained.) The firm/former employer sued under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Defendants (the customer and its new employee) moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion.
It held that the complaint failed to allege “unauthorized access” within the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the CFAA.
The court looked to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), which provides that to access a protected computer “without authorization” is to do so “without any permission at all,” and that to “exceed authorized access” is to “access information on the computer that the person is not entitled to access.” And it looked to the more recent case of U.S. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012), which teaches that an individual does not “exceed authorized access” simply by misusing information that he or she was entitled to view for some other purpose. Under Nosal, the CFAA regulates access to data, not its use by those entitled to access it.
In this case, the court found that the complaint did not allege that defendants were unauthorized to access the scripts in question. In fact, the Statement of Work that the court reviewed specifically granted defendant’s employer and its representatives (including defendant) “sudo access” to “non-shell root commands” that included the scripts at issue.
Plaintiff argued that the access was unauthorized because it had repeatedly refused to grant defendant or his employer the authority to write or edit those scripts. But the court found that argument to address the misuse of the scripts, not unauthorized access. Under Nosal this conduct did not run afoul of the CFAA. So because the complaint failed to allege that defendant and his new employer had no access rights to the scripts, and because the documents upon which plaintiff relied revealed that defendants had certain access rights, the court dismissed the CFAA claim.
Enki Corporation v. Freedman, 2014 WL 261798 (N.D.Cal. January 23, 2014)
Harris ex rel. Harris v. Pontotoc County School Dist., — F.3d —, 2011 WL 814972 (5th Cir., March 10, 2011)
Back in 2008, when Derek Harris was in eighth grade, he got suspended and had to attend “alternative school” for violating the school district’s technology use policy. School officials accused Derek of possessing a keylogger program, of launching a denial of service attack on the school’s network (from the computer his mom used in her job as secretary for the elementary school’s principal), and bypassing security to access the DOS prompt. (Kudos to the kid for getting in trouble for two kinds of “D-O-S” nefariousness!)
Derek’s parents, on his behalf, sued the school in federal court, arguing that the suspension and transfer to alternative school violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The school district moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion.
It quickly dispensed with the argument that sending Derek to an alternative school violated his rights. It observed that a school district may not withdraw the right to a public education on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred. Since transferring him to an alternative education program did not deny access to public education, it did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court likewise held that the suspension was proper and did not violate Derek’s constitutional interests. It reviewed the suspension in light of the 1975 Supreme Court case of Goss v. Lopez, which requires that a student being suspended be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.
In this case, the court found that Derek was notified of the charges on the day he was suspended. He had numerous opportunities to meet with school officials, to hear some of the charges, and to explain and respond. The processes he was afforded, the court found, were sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Leor Exploration v. Aguiar, 2010 WL 3782195 (S.D. Fla. September 28, 2010)
Plaintiffs claimed that defendant hacked into one of the plaintiffs’ email accounts during the litigation to get an advantage in the case. The court entered severe sanctions against defendant for doing this — it struck his answer. In litigation, that is like declaring plaintiffs the winners.
Defendant had argued to the magistrate judge that his mental illness (bipolar disorder) caused him to hack plaintiff’s email account out of fear for his security. Defendant even presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist to support the claim that he lacked the mental state to act in bad faith.
In adopting the magistrate’s findings, the district judge found defendant’s psychiatric expert’s testimony unmoving. (Mainly because defendant’s lawyers limited what the expert could say.) So the court relied on other evidence that showed defendant’s bad faith intent in accessing the email. The novel theory of “not guilty of email hacking by reason of insanity” failed in this case.
Thompson v. Ross, 2010 WL 3896533 (W.D. Pa. September 30, 2010)
Messages from Yahoo and AOL email accounts saved on laptop computer were not in “electronic storage” as defined by Stored Communications Act.
Plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend kept his laptop computer after the two of them broke up. The ex-girlfriend let two of her co-workers access some email messages stored on the computer. Plaintiff filed suit under the Stored Communications Act. Defendants moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion.
Under the Stored Communications Act (at 18 U.S.C. 2701), one is liable if he or she accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.
The court held that the Stored Communications Act did not cover the email messages because they were not in “electronic storage” as defined at 18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(B). In relevant part, that section defines “electronic storage” as “any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”
The court looked to the plain language of the statute, finding that the definition was not met because the messages were not stored by an electronic communication service. It rejected plaintiff’s arguments that the fact the messages were in “backup storage” extended the scope of the definition.