Plaintiff sued defendant in California state court for trade libel and other business torts over confidential reports that defendant provided to its customers (who advertised on plaintiff’s website) characterizing plaintiff’s websites as associated with copyright infringement and adult content.
Defendant moved to dismiss under California’s anti-SLAPP statute which, among other things, protects speech that is a matter of public concern. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff sought review. On appeal, the court affirmed the anti-SLAPP dismissal.
The court held that the communications concerning plaintiff’s websites (as being associated with intellectual property infringement or adult content) were matters of public concern, even though the communications were not public.
FilmOn.com v. DoubleVerify, Inc., 2017 WL 2807911 (Cal. Ct. App., June 29, 2017)
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Black v. Google Inc., 2010 WL 3746474 (N.D.Cal. September 20, 2010)
Back in August, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a lawsuit against Google brought by two pro se plaintiffs, holding that the action was barred under the immunity provisions of 47 USC 230. That section says that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Plaintiffs had complained about a comment on Google (probably a review) disparaging their roofing business.
Plaintiffs filed and “objection” to the dismissal, which the court read as a motion to alter or amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion.
In their “objection,” plaintiffs claimed — apparently without much support — that Congress did not intend Section 230 to apply in situations involving anonymous speech. The court did not buy this argument.
The court looked to the Ninth Circuit case of Carafano v. Metrosplash as an example of a website operator protected under Section 230 from liability for anonymous content: “To be sure, the website [in Carafano] provided neutral tools, which the anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting of defamatory content.” As in Carafano, Google was a passive conduit and could not be liable for failing to detect and remove the allegedly defamatory content.