Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, No. 22-16751 (9th Cir. May 9, 2013)
The copyright holder in certain newspaper articles granted to Righthaven the awkwardly-articulated rights “requisite to have Righthaven recognized as the copyright owner of the [articles] for purposes of Righthaven being able to claim ownership as well as the right to seek redress for past, present, and future infringements of the copyright . . . in and to the [articles].”
After the district court dismissed some of Righthaven’s cases for lack of standing, saying that Righthaven was not an owner of an “exclusive right” as required by the Copyright Act to maintain the suit, Righthaven sought review with the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court’s holding that Righthaven lacked standing.
The court found that the language used to grant rights to Righthaven did not in itself prove that Righthaven owned any exclusive rights. It held that the language in an assignment agreement purporting to transfer ownership is not conclusive. Instead, a court must consider the “substance of the transaction.” Since a separate agreement between Righthaven and the copyright holder placed limits on what Righthaven could do with any copyright assigned to it, Righthaven did not actually possess the required exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, and therefore lacked standing to sue.
BitTorrent copyright trolling continues despite Prenda Law’s self-implosion. But there is hope that courts are coming to their senses.
Earlier this week Judge Wright issued a Hulk smash order lambasting the tactics of notorious copyright troll Prenda Law and finding, among other things, that the firms’ attorneys’ “suffer from a form of moral turpitude unbecoming an officer of the court.”
Though Prenda Law’s copyright trolling days may be numbered, it is still too early to announce the death of BitTorrent copyright trolling. Copyright plaintiffs are still filing lawsuits against swarms of anonymous accused infringers, and courts are still allowing those plaintiffs to seek early discovery of John Does’ names.
But there is reason to believe that courts are recognizing the trolls’ disingenuous efforts to join scores of unknown defendants in a single action. Last week, a federal court in Ohio (in Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-43, 2013 WL 1874862) expressly recognized the concern that some production companies have been “misusing the subpoena powers of the court, seeking the identities of the Doe defendants solely to facilitate demand letters and coerce settlements, rather than ultimately serve process and litigate the claims.” Likewise, the court recognized that other BitTorrent plaintiffs have abused the joinder rules to avoid the payment of thousands of dollars in filing fees that would be required if the actions were brought separately.
So the court issued an ominous warning. Though it found that at this preliminary stage it was appropriate to join all 43 accused swarm participants in a single action, the court noted that “[s]hould [it] find that plaintiff has abused the process of joinder, the individual John Doe defendants may be entitled to — in addition to a severance — sanctions from plaintiff, under [the applicable rule or statute] or the Court’s inherent powers.” The court went on to warn that “[w]hile the Court will not automatically hold plaintiff responsible for the alleged abuses of others in its industry, it will not hesitate to impose sanctions where warranted.”
Though it has taken several years of abusive and extortion-like litigation brought by BitTorrent copyright trolls, we may be entering an era where courts will be more willing to require these trolls to show the courage of their convictions. No doubt we have Prenda Law and its possibly-unlawful tactics to thank mostly for this crackdown. Prenda had a good thing going (from its perspective, of course). Too bad it did not abide by the timeless maxim, “pigs get fed, hogs get slaughtered.”
University of Illinois v. Micron Technology, Inc., No. 11-2288 (C.D.Ill, Order dated April 11, 2013)
The University of Illinois sued Micron for patent infringement. Micron sent an email to several professors that read in part:
Because Micron remains a defendant in a patent infringement lawsuit that [the University] filed against Micron in Federal court in Illinois on December 5, 2011, effective immediately, Micron will no longer recruit [University] students for open positions at any of Micron’s world-wide facilities.
The University asked the court for a preliminary injunction barring future harassing communications from Micron to any University employee. The court denied the motion, holding that:
- the term “harassing” was vague and therefore the requested injunction would violate Rule 65(d)’s requirement that the injunction describe in reasonable detail the acts to be restrained
- the prior restraint of speech would likely violate Micron’s First Amendment rights
- the sought after preliminary injunction did not pertain to the injury alleged in the complaint
Though the court sided in favor of Micron on the question of whether to enter an injunction, it questioned the company’s motives. It found Micron’s decision to be “without tact,” and was “very concerned” that Micron was trying to interfere with the litigation. But there was not sufficient evidence for the court to draw such a conclusion.
AllianceBernstein L.P. v. Atha, — N.Y.S.2d —, 2012 WL 5519060 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., November 15, 2012)
Plaintiff sued its former employee for breach of contract alleging he took client contact information on his iPhone when he left the job. The trial court ordered defendant to turn the iPhone over to plaintiff’s counsel so plaintiff could obtain the allegedly retained information.
Defendant sought review of the discovery order. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded.
The appellate court found that the lower court’s order that defendant turn over his iPhone was beyond the scope of plaintiff’s request and was too broad for the needs of the case. Ordering production of defendant’s iPhone (which, the court observed, has built-in applications and internet access) “was tantamount to ordering the production of his computer.” The iPhone would disclose irrelevant information that might include privileged communications or confidential information.
So the court ordered that the phone and a record of the device’s contents be delivered to the court for an in camera review to determine what, if any information contained on the phone was responsive to plaintiff’s discovery request.
Clint Pharmaceuticals v. Northfield Urgent Care, LLC, 2012 WL 3792546 (Minn. App., September 4, 2012)
Appellant, a healthcare clinic organized as an LLC in Minnesota, got sued in Tennessee. It never showed up to defend itself, so the Tennessee court entered a default judgment against it. When the plaintiff sought to have the Tennessee judgment recognized in Minnesota, the clinic challenged the underlying lawsuit, claiming that the court in Tennessee did not have personal jurisdiction over the clinic, as it had not been properly served with the civil “warrant”.
In this case, the court found that the clinic had been properly served because the papers were opened by the wife of the clinic’s owner. The court found she was “intertwined” with the clinic, and should have known what to do with the papers, based in part on the fact that she was “prominently displayed” on the clinic’s website and interacted with commenters on the clinic’s Facebook page.
Photo courtesy Flickr user jenny downing under this Creative Commons license.
Miller v. State, 2009 WL 3517627 (Ind. App. October 30, 2009)
Appellant Miller and his dad robbed Wedge’s Liquor Store in Logansport, Indiana back in November 2007. During the robbery Miller pulled out a shotgun and pointed it at the clerk’s face.
During closing argument at trial, the prosecutor showed the jury a video from YouTube to illustrate “how easy it was to conceal a weapon inside clothing.” The video was not admitted as evidence but was used merely as a demonstrative aid. The jury convicted Miller and the court sentenced him to 18 years in prison.
Miller appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court made a mistake in letting the jury see the YouTube video. The court agreed with Miller and reversed.
The court noted that experiments and demonstrations may be permitted during trial if they will aid the court and jury. But in this case the court of appeals found that the YouTube video showing how weapons could be concealed could not possibly provide such aid. The state conceded in its appeallate brief that Miller’s defense theory was mistaken identity. So “the whole issue about the ability to hide weapons under clothing was ultimately unimportant.”
Moreover, before showing the video to the jury, the prosecutor said that the video “[had] nothing to do with this case.” The court of appeals agreed with Miller’s argument that the video “[brought] alive the passions of the jury . . . and suggested Miller was not only the robber but that he also . . . intended to . . . cause injury or death.” The video “was irrelevant, prejudical, and confused issues. . . .”
YouTube evidence picture courtesy Flickr user PIAZZA del POPOLO under this Creative Commons license.
Windy City Marketing, Inc. v. Places Advertising, Inc., No. 07-6401 (N.D. Ill., filed November 12, 2007) [Download the complaint]
Windy City Marketing, a Chicago company, has filed a federal lawsuit against a startup competitor, Places Advertising, Inc. The suit alleges infringement of copyright allegedly owned by Windy City Marketing in certain bound marketing pieces called “inside chicago”. Windy City Marketing claims that Places Advertising has wrongfully copied the marketing materials and is distributing those to Windy City Marketing’s customers.
The big problem with the complaint is that there is no allegation that Windy City Marketing owns a registration in the works at issue. A quick read of Section 411 of the Copyright Act will reveal what’s wrong with this picture. You gotta have a registration before you can file a lawsuit for copyright infringement. For the plaintiff’s sake, thank goodness for Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.